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L A B O R L AW
Did Congress Authorize the NLRB to Decide Cases
with Only Two Sitting Board Members?
CASE AT A GLANCE
In late 2007, the National Labor Relations Board (which normally has five members) delegated all of
its powers and authority to a three-member group. When one group-member’s term expired, the two
remaining members continued to issue hundreds of Board decisions. This case asks the Court to determine
whether these two-member Board decisions are valid because of statutory language permitting twomember quorums of three-member panels or invalid because of other statutory language mandating a
three-member quorum “at all times.”

New Process Steel, L.P. v. National Labor Relations Board
Docket No. 08-1457
Argument Date: March 23, 2010
From: The Seventh Circuit
by Anne Marie Lofaso
West Virginia University College of Law in Morgantown, W.V.
By legislative enactment of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA),
29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169, as amended, Congress created the National
Labor Relations Board (NLRB), a federal agency tasked with remedying and preventing unfair labor practices (29 U.S.C. §§ 158, 160) and
with resolving questions concerning union representation (29 U.S.C.
§ 159). The NLRB acts, in part, through a five-member Board, whose
members are “appointed by the President by and with the advice and
consent of the Senate.” 29 U.S.C. § 153(a).
NLRA Section 3(b) authorizes the Board “to delegate to any group of
three or more members any or all of the powers which it may itself
exercise.” 29 U.S.C. § 153(a). Section 3(b) further authorizes that
“[a] vacancy in the Board shall not impair the right of the remaining
members to exercise all of the powers of the Board, and three members of the Board shall, at all times, constitute a quorum of the Board,
except that two members shall constitute a quorum of any group
designated” by the Board. A panel of three Board members typically
issues decisions and orders in unfair labor practice and representation cases arising under the NLRA.
In 2002, following a brief period in which the agency was reduced to
two Board members, the agency solicited an opinion from the United
States Department of Justice’s Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) on the
question of whether the Board could continue to operate with only
two members. By memo dated March 4, 2003 (OLC Memo 1), OLC
opined that the NLRB “may issue decisions even when only two of its
five seats are filled, if the Board, at a time when it has at least three
members, delegates all of its powers to a three-member group and the
two remaining members are part of this group and both participate in
the decisions.”
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In late 2007, the Board already had one vacancy and anticipated
losing two of the remaining members imminently when their recess
appointments expired. On December 20, 2007, the four-member
Board (Liebman, Schaumber, Kirsanow, and Walsh) delegated all of
the Board’s power effective December 28, 2007, to a three-member
group consisting of members Liebman, Schaumber, and Kirsanow
(the designated group). On December 31, 2007, the terms of members
Kirsanow and Walsh expired, leaving a two-member Board whose
members were part of the designated group to which the four-member
Board had delegated all of its power. Since January 1, 2008, the twomember Board has issued hundreds of decisions and orders, including one in the present case.

ISSUE
Does the National Labor Relations Board have authority to decide
cases with only two sitting members, where 29 U.S.C. § 153(b) provides that “three members of the Board shall, at all times, constitute a
quorum of the Board”?

FACTS
Petitioner New Process Steel operates several steel processing plants
in the United States and Mexico, including one in Butler, Indiana. In
September 2006, petitioner began negotiating a collective-bargaining
agreement with the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO (Union), the certified bargaining representative of employees at petitioner’s Butler plant. After extensive negotiations, the parties reached agreement. But when petitioner received
some employee complaints about the contract-ratification procedure,
petitioner withdrew recognition from the Union.
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Acting on the Union’s unfair labor practice charge filed with the
NLRB, the Board’s general counsel issued a complaint alleging that
petitioner had violated NLRA § 8(a)(1) and (5), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1)
and (5), by wrongfully repudiating a valid collective-bargaining agreement. After holding a hearing, an administrative law judge (ALJ)
issued a decision in May 2008, finding that petitioner had violated the
Act as alleged. Later that month, the general counsel issued a second
complaint, alleging that petitioner violated its duty to bargain by
withdrawing recognition from the Union during the term of a binding
contract. The general counsel moved the Board for summary judgment on the second complaint, based on petitioner’s admission that it
had withdrawn recognition.
In September 2008, the Board issued decisions resolving both
complaints. In its first decision, the Board, in agreement with the
ALJ, found that petitioner had violated the NLRA by repudiating the
collective-bargaining agreement and ordered, among other things,
petitioner to adhere to the contract and make employees whole for
resulting losses. In its second decision, the Board granted the general
counsel’s motion for summary judgment and ordered, among other
things, petitioner to recognize and bargain with the Union.
Petitioner timely filed petitions to review the Board’s orders in the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. The Board crosspetitioned the court of appeals to enforce those orders; the court
consolidated the petitions. Petitioner not only disputed the substance
of the Board’s unfair labor practice ruling, but also challenged the
Board’s authority to issue its decisions. The Seventh Circuit rejected
petitioner’s challenges to the Board’s unfair labor practices findings,
rejected petitioner’s challenge to the Board’s authority to issue the
decisions, denied petitioner’s petition for review, and enforced the
Board’s orders.
The Supreme Court thereafter granted New Process Steel’s petition
for a writ of certiorari to resolve the important question of the Board’s
authority to decide cases with only two sitting members, a question
over which the courts of appeals are split.

CASE ANALYSIS
This case affords the Supreme Court the opportunity to interpret the
statutory language of Section 3(b) of the NLRA:
The Board is authorized to delegate to any group of three or
more members any or all of the powers which it may itself
exercise. … A vacancy in the Board shall not impair the
right of the remaining members to exercise all of the powers of the Board, and three members of the Board shall, at
all times, constitute a quorum of the Board, except that two
members shall constitute a quorum of any group designated
pursuant to the first sentence hereof.
Both parties (petitioner New Process Steel and the respondent NLRB)
and their supporting amici argue that the statute’s plain language,
the NLRA’s legislative history, and public policy support their respective positions. Both parties also discuss the extent to which
the Board’s interpretation of Section 3(b) is entitled to deference.
Accordingly, this case affords the Court the opportunity to showcase
its philosophy of statutory interpretation in the administrative law
context.
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Plain Language Argument
Petitioner and its supporting amici contend that the NLRA’s plain
language does not authorize a two-person Board to act because the
NLRA expressly requires the Board to have three members “at all
times.” To support that argument, petitioner observes as a threshold
matter that Section 3(a), which created the National Labor Relations
Board, defines the Board as “an agency of the United States … that
… shall consist of five members.” 29 U.S.C. § 153(a). Petitioner proceeds then to Section 3(b) and posits that it must be read in light of
Section 3(a). Petitioner then deconstructs the plain meaning of each
sentence in drawing the following conclusion: “three members have
the authority to reach decisions whether the Board consists of three
or four or five members, but that at a minimum, three members must
always be present for the Board to issue decisions. At the same time,
when there is a delegation to a group pursuant to the first sentence of
Section 153(b), the three members of the group can reach decision by
a majority of two. A vacancy in a three-member group precludes any
action by that group unless the missing member is replaced.”
The respondent Board and its supporting amicus, AFL-CIO, contend
that the NLRA’s plain language authorizes a two-person Board to act
when the two members are a quorum of a three-member Board designated by the full Board. To support that argument, the Board contends
that Section 3(b) establishes three basic rules that govern the fivemember NLRB’s exercise of authority. First, the Board may delegate
any or all of its powers to a group consisting of three members. Second, the NLRB may act when it has a general Board quorum requiring
the participation of at least three members in any action taken by the
Board as a whole. Third, the NLRB may act by special group quorum
that operates as an exception to the general three-member Board
quorum. Under this special quorum rule, the Board may act when
the Board delegates its authority to that group so long as at least two
members of the group are participating in the Board’s decision.
Joining those arguments, the main disagreement between petitioner
and respondent in this case centers on the statutory word except in
the last sentence of Section 3(b). In the Board’s view, except yokes the
general and special-group quorum provisions together. Accordingly,
two-member boards may act if they were once part of a designated
three-member group. In petitioner’s view, on the other hand, except
modifies the first sentence of Section 3(b) by permitting a threemember Board to act by majority of two members (including in cases
where one member fails to participate in the decision for any reason,
including recusal), but not by allowing a two-member Board to act.
Legislative History
Petitioner contends that the NLRA’s legislative history supports its
argument. It contends that although Congress authorized the Board
to hear cases in three-member panels or groups when it increased
the size of the Board from three to five members (in the Taft-Hartley
amendments), Congress also wanted to ensure that “at all times” a
quorum of the Board shall remain three members. To support this
conclusion, petitioner relies on passages from the legislative history
suggesting that the main purpose in going from a three- to fivemember Board was to increase administrative efficiency and to create
three-member Board panels that would operate more like appellate
court panels.
By contrast, the NLRB contends that by allowing the Board to delegate
any or all of its powers to a group of three members and by allowPREVIEW of United States Supreme Court Cases

ing such groups to operate with a two-member quorum, Congress
sanctioned the Board’s practice in the twelve years preceding those
amendments. During that time, the Board routinely conducted business with a two-member quorum of the (then) three-member Board.
To support its conclusion, the NLRB relies on passages from the
legislative history suggesting that Congress was comfortable with the
Board acting with only two members and also passages demonstrating that Congress was concerned with helping the Board act more
efficiently even at a larger size by authorizing it to act in panels and
to exercise its powers through these panels.
Joining those arguments, both parties agree that the legislative
history supports the Board’s practice of acting in panels of three and
that those panels of three may decide cases in which a majority of two
members agree, even in cases where one member fails to participate
in the decision. But the parties disagree about the extent to which
the legislative history supports other circumstances under which the
Board may act with only two members. In particular, the NLRB, in
disagreement with petitioner, contends that the legislative history
supports its view that two-member Boards may act so long as they
were previously part of a three-member group.
Policy
Petitioner makes several policy arguments to support its position.
First, it contends that Congress would not reasonably have created
a two-member (or any even-numbered) quorum because it imposes
a “supermajority” requirement on that quorum (in this case two of
two members) to act. In rebuttal, the NLRB contends that petitioner’s
contention is both irrelevant to the question presented, which only
asks what Congress had authorized, and in any event mischaracterizes Congress’s choice. The NLRB explains that Congress chose not
to create a board consisting of an even number of members in the
first instance, but to create a five-member board that may, in some
instances, act with only two members.
Petitioner further contends that a two-member Board issues decisions without meaningful debate or full deliberation. To support that
conclusion, petitioner notes several decisions that one of the two
Board members signed onto by applying Board precedent but with
which that member did not agree as a matter of national labor policy.
Petitioner seems also to suggest that the NLRB’s historical practice
(1947–2007) of not issuing decisions with a two-member Board
(taken together with the practice of other federal agencies to refrain
from acting in similar circumstances), reinforces its argument that
a three-member minimum is optimal, if not required, for Board
adjudication.
In rebuttal, the Board grants petitioner’s point that on occasion one
of the two Board members have signed on to cases with which he or
she disagrees as an ideological matter. But the Board contends that
petitioner has failed to show how that fact invalidates the administrative decision. As the Board points out, its members routinely follow
the practice of applying sound legal precedent with which a member
disagrees but does not have a sufficient majority to override governing precedent.
Petitioner also contends that common sense and various common
law principles governing private corporations and private agency
relationships support its interpretation of Section 3(b)’s three-person
quorum requirement. In rebuttal, the NLRB contends that allowing
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two-member quorums of three-member panels to issue decisions is
consistent with generic background legal principles governing the
operation of government agencies. The NLRB urges that when these
legal principles conflict with common law principles (that is, principles fashioned by judges in the course of deciding cases), the Court
should give force to the NLRB’s actions, which themselves have the
force of law—in this case, federal law. Along these lines, the NLRB
contends that nowhere in Section 3(b)’s plain language is there room
to conclude that Congress intended to deprive NLRB decision making
of its legal force based on principles of state common law regarding
corporations or agency.
Both parties also address the extent to which a two-member Board
helps the agency overcome administrative paralysis caused by the
departure of Board members. Petitioner contends that even if that is
true, the authority to ensure administrative ability to function rests
not with the NLRB or the courts but with the president or Congress.
Chevron Deference
Under general principles of administrative law and statutory construction, the Supreme Court will defer to reasonable agency interpretations of the statute that Congress charged the agency with administering. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467
U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984). Although that deferential standard is generally applicable to the NLRB’s statutory interpretation of the NLRA, it is
not available when the statute’s plain language governs.
Petitioner contends that the interpretation of Section 3(b) set forth by
the NLRB is not entitled to Chevron deference for two reasons. First,
the statute’s plain language governs. Second, principles of agency
deference simply do not apply in this case because the Board is not
setting forth its own construction of the NLRA, but rather the interpretation of the NLRA as supplied to it by the Department of Justice.
In rebuttal, the NLRB contends that the Court need not decide this
issue because Section 3(b)’s plain language unambiguously supports
its interpretation. The NLRB further contends that to the extent the
Court finds that Section 3(b) is susceptible to more than one interpretation, it should defer to the two-person quorum construction of
Section 3(b). This is because that construction is in fact based on the
NLRB’s own considered and reasonable interpretation, notwithstanding the fact that the NLRB agreed to be bound by OLC’s interpretation,
which confirmed the NLRB’s reasonable interpretation. Second, to the
extent there is any doubt in this regard, under Skidmore v. Swift &
Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944), the Board is at least entitled to the kind
of judicial deference owed agency actions having persuasive authority. Petitioner, however, suggests that the Board’s entitlement to such
judicial deference is undermined by the Board’s failure to engage in
any public deliberation.

SIGNIFICANCE
This case could affect hundreds of labor cases. Petitioner points out
that the parties to many of those cases are voluntarily complying with
the Board’s order. But if the Supreme Court rules in petitioner’s favor,
then the aggrieved parties in those cases where there currently is
compliance may petition the courts of appeals to review those decisions (there are no time limits on filing such petitions). The courts
of appeals would then be forced to invalidate the Board’s order, and
there would be no further compliance in these cases.
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Although this case affords the Court an opportunity to showcase its
philosophy of legislative interpretation in the administrative context,
its ultimate statement about democracy and the role of dissent is
potentially its most significant legacy. The current two-member Board
has been careful to decide only the most innocuous cases in the last
two years, perhaps because the two members draw their ideological
philosophy from opposing values underlying the NLRA. But future
two-member Boards may not be so constituted. The fewer members
of a decision-making body, the less room for diverse opinion and the
less likelihood that dissenting views will inform the ultimate decision. While this policy does little to inform the question presented,
it certainly informs the strength of the democratic value underlying
administrative deliberation.

Anne Marie Lofaso is an associate professor of law at West Virginia
University College of Law in Morgantown, W.V. She can be reached at
anne.lofaso@mail.wvu.edu or 304.293.7356.
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